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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
STEPHEN A. SLUSHER*

I. INTRODUCTION
During the survey year, New Mexico appellate courts issued numerous
opinions affecting criminal procedure, though few cases broke new ground.
The New Mexico Supreme Court continued an active role, reviewing and
reversing the court of appeals on certiorari.' At least one survey case,
involving disqualification of judges, has significant impact beyond the
criminal field. 2
II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
The fourth amendment remains a changing body of law, with a distinctly conservative bias present in the decisions of both the United States
and New Mexico Supreme Courts. Absent egregious misconduct by the
police, a search conducted pursuant to a search warrant is becoming
unassailable. 3 While the major tenets of fourth amendment law as evolved
over the past quarter century remain, 4 few new areas of protection are
developing, and existing standards are being narrowed and focused.
A. Search Warrants
1. Nighttime Searches
In State v. Hausler,5 the New Mexico Supreme Court considered what
the affiant and issuing magistrate must do to authorize a search between
the hours of 10:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. The supreme court, which reversed
the court of appeals on the issue, held that the magistrate must both
authorize the nighttime search and have reasonable cause, but the reasonable cause need not appear in the affidavit or warrant. In Hausler, the
issuing magistrate had specifically stated in the warrant that it could be
*Deputy District Attorney, Second Judicial District, State of New Mexico; B.A., St. John's
College, 1974; J.D., University of New Mexico School of Law, 1977.
1. Of the 35 cases decided during the survey year discussed in this Article, 10 are supreme court
decisions on certiorari to the court of appeals.
2. See infra notes 75-85 and accompanying text.
3. See, e.g., infra notes 5-14 and accompanying text.
4. The exclusionary rule, which has virtually been eliminated for searches conducted pursuant
to a warrant even where probable cause is lacking, is an exception. See infra note 13 and accompanying text.
5. 101 N.M. 143, 679 P.2d 811 (1983).
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served at any time. The supporting affidavit, however, contained only
conclusory language to the effect that the property would be destroyed
if not immediately seized. There were no facts in the affidavit to support
the conclusion.
The court found the precise wording of Rule 17(b) 6 determinative
because it did not specify where the reasonable cause need appear. Thus,
the court held that reasonable cause for a nighttime search need not be
included in the affidavit. Accordingly, the case was remanded for a determination of whether reasonable cause was presented to the magistrate
at the time of issuing the warrant, even though not incorporated into the
affidavit.
2. Probable Cause
Only one case actually dealt with the sufficiency of an affidavit, and
it applied standards which have subsequently been altered or eliminated
by the United States Supreme Court. In State v. Donaldson,7 four pounds
of cocaine were found in a house, and eighteen pounds were found in a
vehicle. The search warrant for the house was challenged. The court of
appeals utilized the two-pronged test of Aguilar-Spinelli' to substantiate
the credibility of confidential informants, a test which has since been
rejected by the United States Supreme Court. 9 Applying the standard of
review set forth in State v. Snedeker, " the court determined that the
affidavit did set forth sufficient probable cause.
6. N.M. R. Crim. P. 17(b) (Repl. Pamp. 1980) provides in relevant part:
A search warrant shall direct that it be served between the hours of 6:00 a.m. and
10:00 p.m., according to local time, unless the issuing judge, by appropriate provision in the warrant, and for reasonable cause shown, authorizes its execution at
any time.
Prior to a 1980 amendment, the rule had provided that a nighttime search was proper only if the
sworn written statement was positive that the property was in the place to be searched and there
was probable cause to believe it would be moved or destroyed.
7. 100 N.M. 111, 666 P.2d 1258 (Ct. App. 1983).
8. See Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
The two-pronged test derived from these cases focuses on (1) specifying the informant's "basis of
knowledge" and (2) providing sufficient facts to establish either the informant's "veracity" or the
"reliability" of the informant's information.
9. See Illinois v. Gates, 103 S.Ct. 2317 (1983). In Gates, the Court adopted a "totality of the
circumstances" test in determining the reliability of an unnamed informant. As Massachusetts v.
Upton, 104 S.Ct. 2085 (1984), made clear, the two-pronged test derived from Aguilar and Spinelli
has been abandoned in favor of the "totality of the circumstances" test. Because of the provisions
of N.M. R. Crim. P. 16, which appear to incorporate the Aguilar-Spinelli standard into state law,
the Gates decision is of questionable vitality in New Mexico practice.
10. 99 N.M. 286, 657 P.2d 613 (1982). Snedeker is generally cited for the proposition that great
deference ought to be paid to the issuing magistrate's decision. The actual issue decided in Snedeker
was that a magistrate need not rely solely on the information in an affidavit for a search warrant,
but could draw reasonable inferences from that information. Particularly in light of the criticism of
the exclusionary rule in Snedeker, id. at 289, 657 P.2d at 616, the opinion can be read as a challenge
to the viability of the exclusionary rule, an issue recently addressed by the United States Supreme
Court. See infra text accompanying notes 11-14.
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The Donaldson decision predates United States v. Leon, " in which the
United States Supreme Court rejected routine review by trial and appellate
courts of the determination of probable cause by the issuing magistrate.
In Leon, a confidential informant of "unproven reliability" gave basic
information establishing probable cause. Although an extensive investigation obtained corroborating evidence, the evidence obtained was "as
consistent with innocence as with guilt."'"2 Motions to suppress were
granted upon a determination that the affidavit was insufficient to establish
probable cause. The government urged both the trial and appellate courts
to adopt an exception to the exclusionary rule because the evidence had
been seized in reasonable, good-faith reliance on a search warrant.
In Leon, the United States Supreme Court abandoned the rigid application of the exclusionary rule by adopting a "good faith" exception to
the rule. When evidence is seized by officers acting in objective reasonable
reliance on a search warrant and the search warrant is issued by a detached
and neutral magistrate, the evidence may not be suppressed even if the
affidavit is later determined to lack probable cause.' 3 While New Mexico
courts could continue to apply the pre-Leon standard under the state
constitution and thus hold that exclusion of evidence is the proper remedy,
the courts have rarely applied a higher state constitutional standard than
that required under the parallel federal constitutional provision. 4 The next
survey year should see New Mexico decide on the course to be followed.
3. Seizure Prior to Search
In State v. Burdex, 5 the court of appeals held that securing a dwelling
prior to the issuance of a search warrant did not invalidate the search.
Police went to the defendant's residence without a warrant and were
refused consent to search by the defendant's wife. The police allowed
the defendant's wife to change clothes, escorting her into the dwelling
for that purpose, and then instructed her to leave. She was not allowed
11. 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984).
12. Id. at 3438 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
13. The Court did identify situations in which exclusion would remain the appropriate remedy,
including use of false information, use of information obtained in reckless disregard of the truth,
situations where the issuing magistrate wholly abandons a judicial role, and reliance on an affidavit
without particularized facts or even colorable probable cause. 104 S. Ct. at 3421-22. While the new
rule was characterized as a good-faith "excep5tion" for searches conducted pursuant to warrant, the
exception appears to leave little room for the exclusionary rule.
14. N.M. Const. art. II, § 10 is at least coextensive with the fourth amendment; it provides:
The people shall be secure in their persons, papers, homes and effects, from
unreasonable searches and seizures, and no warrant to search any place, or seize
any person or thing, shall issue without describing the place to be searched, or
the persons or things to be seized, nor without a written showing of probable
cause, supported by oath or affirmation.
While New Mexico courts frequently cite to both relevant state and federal constitutional provisions,
there is a dearth of cases applying a higher state standard.
15. 100 N.M. 197, 668 P.2d 313 (Ct. App. 1983).
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back into the dwelling until after an authorized search took place the next
day. The defendant argued that the initial intrusion by the police was
constitutionally invalid, and therefore that any evidence subsequently
obtained should be suppressed.
Generally, the burden is on the state to sustain a warrantless search. 6
In Burdex, however, there was no evidence that the police conducted a
search when they secured the residence or that the warrant was predicated
upon observations made while securing the residence. The absence of
evidence establishing a warrantless search led the court to find no fourth
amendment violations, and hence no evidence to suppress."
4. Aerial Surveillance
The problems engendered by aerial surveillance were considered in
two cases, State v. Bigler"5 and State v. Rogers. 9 Both involved initial
aerial surveillance, followed by a search. In Bigler, a police officer acting
on a tip flew over the defendant's property and observed what he thought
was marijuana growing among rows of corn. He then made the same
observation on the ground from a county road and additionally smelled
the odor of green marijuana. A warrant was obtained, and the search
16. See, e.g., State v. Gonzales, 97 N.M. 182, 637 P.2d 1237 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 97 N.M.
242, 638 P.2d 1087 (1981). In Gonzales, there was a warrantless search of a suitcase in the trunk
of a vehicle parked by a nightclub near the Mexican border. The search was ultimately upheld under
the "border search exception" to the fourth amendment, which was developed in United States v.
Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606 (1977).
17. 100 N.M. at 203, 668 P.2d at 319. In Segura v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 3380 (1984), a
case decided last term, the United States Supreme Court was presented with a similar issue. One
defendant was arrested upon entering an apartment building. He was forcibly escorted to his apartment, which agents then entered and secured, arresting the other person residing there. Both lower
courts had held the initial entry to be illegal, but that issue was not reviewed by the Supreme Court.
No search occurred until the next day when a warrant was obtained.
The Segura decision distinguished a search from a seizure. While searches implicate privacy
rights, seizures implicate possessory interests, requiring a lesser standard of protection. Segura
involved a seizure. The Supreme Court thus held that "securing a dwelling, on the basis of probable
cause, to prevent the destruction or removal of evidence while a search warrant is being sought is
not itself an unreasonable seizure of either the dwelling or its contents." Id. at 3389.
The Supreme Court applied a "but for" test in determining whether the evidence was the product
of the illegal entry. The agents had obtained the warrant based upon facts known to them independent
of the seizure. Since the illegal entry did not contribute to the discovery of the evidence obtained
pursuant to the warrant, the test was not met. Therefore, exclusion of the evidence was not required
because it was not "fruit of the poisonous tree." See United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463 (1980).
The Court rejected an expansion of the "but for" test premised upon the discovery being possible
because of the inability, by virtue of the seizure, of defendants or their friends to remove or to
destroy the evidence. To at least five of the justices, that argument defied "both logic and common
sense." 104 S. Ct. at 3392.
The New Mexico Court of Appeals decision in Burdex, while not as extensive an analysis, reached
the same conclusion as Segura. Unlike Segura, however, there was no apparent determination of
the legality of the initial entry.
18. 100 N.M. 515, 673 P.2d 140 (1983).
19. 100 N.M. 517, 673 P.2d 142 (1983).
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yielded 5,680 pounds of marijuana plants. In Rogers, officers flew over
the defendant's property in a helicopter, observing marijuana protruding
from holes in the roof of a greenhouse. The initial observation was
confirmed with the use of field glasses. Based upon these observations,
a warrant was obtained.
The fourth amendment issues were framed in terms of the defendants'
justifiable expectations of privacy and the appropriateness of the surveillance techniques. Both defendants resided in areas where air traffic
was not uncommon. Based largely on that fact, the court concluded that
neither defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy, at least to the
extent of visibility from the air.20 On the issue of appropriateness of the
surveillance techniques, the court had trouble with the facts in Rogers
because the surveillance necessarily included a building within the defendant's curtilage. The court analyzed the nature of the overflight, including altitude, the reason for the overflight, and length and extent of
the intrusion. In light of the fact that the officers were acting on a tip and
had minimized the intrusion, however, the court concluded that the surveillance methods were not unreasonable.
B. Warrantless Searches
1. Plain View
In State v. Krout,21 the New Mexico Supreme Court determined that
an officer attempting to execute an arrest warrant can look anywhere that
might reasonably produce the subject of the warrant. A police officer
learned from two different sources where the subject of an arrest warrant
was living. He went to the location and knocked on the door of the
residence, but received no answer. The officer walked around the building
and looked in a window, observing what appeared to be marijuana plants.
The officer then went to a second building, a greenhouse. He found two
doors to the greenhouse: one was padlocked from the outside, the other
was wired shut. After knocking and receiving no response, he looked
through a crack next to a door and observed several rows of plants which
appeared to be marijuana.
Armed with this information, the officer obtained a search warrant and
seized the marijuana. The owners of the property were charged with
20. In Oliver v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 1735 (1984), the Supreme Court held that there is no
legitimate expectation of privacy in an open field, and thus no fourth amendment rights are implicated
when officers, without a warrant, observe an open field. This is true even if "No Trespassing" signs
are present. In Bigler, applying the open fields doctrine, even though the defendant had surrounded
his field with six rows of corn, the defendant clearly had no legitimate expectation of privacy. The
Oliver decision casts doubt on the validity of another New Mexico case, State v. Chort, 91 N.M.
584, 577 P.2d 892 (Ct. App. 1978), which held that a police officer riding a horse onto defendant's
property so that he could look into a fenced area amounted to an unreasonable government intrusion.
21. 100 N.M. 661, 674 P.2d 1121 (1984).
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marijuana-related offenses and moved to suppress the evidence.22 The
trial court suppressed the evidence after finding that the officer "did not
have lawful authority sufficient to allow his view through the cracks of
the greenhouse door." 23 The court of appeals affirmed, holding that because the officer had no reason to believe that the subject of the arrest
warrant would be located other than at the residence, the officer was
without authority to search.24
On certiorari, the New Mexico Supreme Court reversed, concluding
that since the officer had reason to believe the subject was living on the
premises, a large rural piece of property, the officer "had the right to
enter the premises or any part that might reasonably produce the subject
of the warrant. "25 Because the officer was lawfully on the premises,26 his
observation of the marijuana in plain view was proper.27
2. Joint Endeavor with a Private Investigator
In State v. Cox,2" the defendant was charged with the arson of his own
home to collect insurance. The trial court suppressed certain evidence
22. The subject of the initial arrest warrant was evidently not charged with the marijuana-related
offenses.
23. 100 N.M. at 662, 674 P.2d at 1122.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 663, 674 P.2d at 1123 (emphasis in original). The court of appeals applied a subjective
test, making the belief of the officer as to whether the subject was in the greenhouse or otherwise
on the premises the determining factor. The supreme court applied an objective test, focusing on
whether the search might reasonably produce the subject of the warrant.
26. It is not clear whether the premises were specified in the arrest warrant as the residence of
the subject. From the New Mexico Supreme Court opinion, it appears that the officer learned of the
possible residence after the warrant issued. Both that opinion and the unpublished court of appeals
opinion cited Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980), for the proposition that an arrest warrant
is sufficient authority to enter a dwelling in which the suspect lives if there is reason to believe the
subject is there.
The court of appeals also mentioned Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981), but did not
develop the analysis. Steagald involved the search of a third person's residence by officers holding
a valid arrest warrant for a subject and having reason to believe that the subject of the warrant was
at the third person's residence. The United States Supreme Court held that a search warrant was
required to search for a person named in an arrest warrant on the premises of a third person. In
Krout, at best it appears that the officer only thought that the subject of the arrest warrant was living
on the premises, and it is clear that third persons, the owners, were believed to reside there. The
status of the subject as visitor, guest, or resident, was never established. Even if the subject was a
guest, the entry would not have violated the subject's fourth amendment privacy rights. See, e.g.,
United States v. Underwood, 717 F.2d 482 (9th Cir. 1983) (en banc), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1309
(1984).
If the subject of the arrest warrant was not a resident, or the premises were not specified in the
arrest warrant, it is hard to see how the privacy rights of the owners were not violated under a
Steagald analysis. The issue in Steagald was "whether an arrest warrant-as opposed to a search
warrant-is adequate to protect the Fourth Amendment interests of persons not named in the warrant,
when their houses are searched without their consent and in the absence of exigent circumstances."
451 U.S. at 212. This issue was never reached in Krout and may not have been squarely before the
court.
27. See, e.g., Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968).
28. 100 N.M. 667,674 P.2d 1127 (1983).
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upon the motion of the defendant, and the state appealed. At issue was
whether the evidence seized was taken as a result of government action
or private action.
The fire was extinguished in the early morning hours of December 14,
1982. A cursory search and seizure of samples was conducted around
noon that day by a police officer and fire fighters. The next day, a police
officer put up a "Do Not Enter" sign on the house. On December 18, a
private investigator, a police officer, and the fire chief went to the scene.
They examined and seized a five-gallon can and samples of wood products. No warrant, either administrative or based upon probable cause,
was ever obtained.
Following a United States Supreme Court decision,29 the court of appeals concluded that a warrant was required if there was government
action. The court held that government action is implicated when a law
enforcement officer participates in a joint endeavor with a private investigator as part of an ongoing criminal investigation. Since the fire chief
had cut the samples of wood, and the police officer had taken custody
of them, it was clear government action was involved. Accordingly, the
court affirmed the trial court's suppression of the evidence.
III. THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
The fifth amendment remains a relatively static body of law. Miranda
and its progeny remain unchanged.3 ° Only in the area of immunity is
there any discernible evolution in the law.3" That movement is, in large
part, a result of creative application of grants of use and derivative use
immunity by prosecutors.
A. Miranda Warnings
1. Custodial Interrogation
In State v. Swise,32 the New Mexico Supreme Court considered whether
Mirandawarnings are required if a defendant is not in custody or deprived
of freedom in some significant way. Police officers, investigating a death,
had received information that the decedent had been seen several days
prior to his death handcuffed and restrained by the defendant. They went
to the defendant's place of business, advised him that they were police
29. Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978). In Tyler, the Court held that entry to fight a fire
requires no warrant and that, upon entry, officers may remain for a reasonable time to investigate
the cause of the fire. If evidence of criminal conduct is discovered during the course of the administrative investigation, a warrant must be obtained. The decision was reaffirmed in Michigan v.
Clifford, 104 S. Ct. 641 (1984).
30. Neither of the cases discussed in this Article involving Miranda rights represents an analytic
departure from the original precepts behind the Miranda decision.
31. See infra text accompanying notes 39-56.
32. 100 N.M. 256, 669 P.2d 732 (1983).
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officers, and that they were investigating a possible homicide. They spoke
with defendant for no more than ten minutes. During this interview, the
defendant was not placed under arrest or held in any type of restraint.
Two subsequent statements were given, but played no part in the appeal.
The trial court suppressed the statements. It determined that the interview constituted a police interrogation because the investigation focused
on the defendant, and as an objective matter, the defendant was not free
to leave the premises. The court of appeals upheld the trial court's ruling,
and the supreme court reversed.
The supreme court began its analysis by determining the factors which
trigger the giving of Miranda warnings. It noted two views: the minority
view requiring Miranda warnings when an investigation focuses on the
individual as a suspect; and the majority view requiring Mirandawarnings
when the defendant is in custody or deprived of his freedom in some
significant way.33 The court adopted the majority view, and in an unusual
occurrence, concluded that the trial court's factual findings were not
supported by the evidence." There was no evidence that the defendant
was placed under any restraint during the questioning. Thus, the coercive
atmosphere that Miranda protects against was simply not present. The
order suppressing the statement, therefore, was reversed.
2. Waiver of the Right to Counsel
In State v. Boeglin35 the court of appeals considered the standards
necessary to establish a valid waiver of the right to counsel subsequent
to invocation of the right to counsel. Phillip Boeglin was arrested for
homicide following the discovery of a body on the morning of February
12, 1982. He received Miranda warnings, denied any knowledge of the
homicide, and then requested an attorney. After his request, an officer
remained with him in the interview room. The defendant and the officer
engaged in "casual" conversation, though the homicide was apparently
discussed and the officer asked the defendant to discuss the homicide.
Some fifteen minutes after the invocation of his right to counsel, the
interview started again; this interview was tape recorded.
33. In United States v. Oliver, 505 F.2d 301 (7th Cir. 1974), it was held that, in the context of
an Internal Revenue Service investigation, "custody" existed when the investigation focused on the
taxpayer, even in the absence of any actual restraints. Oliver was overruled in United States v.
Fitzgerald, 545 F.2d 578 (7th Cir. 1976), and the approach was generally rejected in Beckwith v.
United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976).
34. As a general rule, an appellate court can only determine whether the evidence substantially
supports the factual findings. State v. Bidegain, 88 N.M. 466, 541 P.2d 971 (1975). It is rare to
find a case where the record does not support the findings of a trial court.
35. 100 N.M. 127, 666 P.2d 1274 (Ct. App.), rev'd on other grounds, 100 N.M. 740, 672 P.2d
643 (1983). During the survey year, Mr. Boeglin had several separate appeals giving rise to opinions
by appellate courts. This case involves an interlocutory appeal from murder and related charges; his
other appeals arose in the context of contempt convictions resulting from his refusal to testify against
co-defendants. See infra notes 39-50 and accompanying text.
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The defendant was specifically asked whether he would now talk to
the police without an attorney. Upon receiving an affirmative response,
the police questioned the defendant and obtained a statement from him
explaining his whereabouts and denying any involvement in the homicide.
The defendant was then booked into jail. During the booking process,
the defendant was allowed to telephone a private attorney. The defendant
spoke to a secretary in the attorney's office; a short time later he received
a message, relayed by a jailer, that the attorney would represent the
defendant for $10,000 "up front cash." The defendant indicated he could
not afford that kind of money.
About an hour after learning that the private attorney wanted $10,000,
the defendant asked a jailer to let him talk to the district attorney. The
defendant was then taken to the district attorney's office, where he spoke
with an investigator who had questioned him earlier. He was once again
given his Miranda warnings, but indicated that he wanted to talk. He
then gave a statement implicating himself in the homicide. He subsequently led officers to the location where the murder weapon and other
evidence had been concealed. Later that evening, a fourth statement was
obtained.
The trial court denied motions to suppress both the statements and the
evidence. The court of appeals characterized the issue as whether the
defendant, after invoking his right to counsel, had (1) knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently elected to waive his right, and (2) initiated the
communications subsequent to the invocation of his right to counsel. The
court held that both standards must be met to establish a valid confession
subsequent to invocation of the right to counsel.36
The court of appeals concluded that the trial court had failed to make
express findings on the issues of waiver by the defendant and of initiation
of communications following the defendant's invocation of his right to
counsel. According to the appellate court, the trial court's findings were
conclusory and were, in part, contradictory." The court of appeals emphasized that the burden was on the state and that there was a presumption
against the waiver of a constitutional right.38 Accordingly, the case was
remanded for further findings by the trial court.
36. Id. at 132, 666 P.2d at 1279. The court relied on Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
Edwards held that, once an accused invokes his right to counsel, interrogation absent counsel is
impermissible "unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges or conversations with the police." Id. at 485. Edwards explicitly prohibits attempts by police to reinterrogate
an accused who is in custody once he has asserted his right to counsel. Id. at 484-85.
. 37. 100 N.M. at 133, 666 P.2d at 1280. The trial court had found that "no evidence to be utilized
in the case was taken." Id. at 130, 666 P.2d at 1277. In point of fact, a firearm and other evidence
was recovered as a direct result of the defendant's statements. Further, the defendant actually led
officers to the items.
38. See State v. Green, 92 N.M. 347, 588 P.2d 548 (1978); State v. Briggs, 81 N.M. 581, 469
P.2d 730 (Ct. App. 1970).

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15

B. Immunity
Four separate opinions dealt with compelled testimony pursuant to a
grant of immunity.39 In two cases, State v. Chavez' and State v. Boeglin,4 1
42
the court of appeals abandoned its previous decision in State v. Urioste
in favor of the United States Supreme Court decision in Murphy v. Waterfront Commission.43 Both cases involved defendants held in contempt for
failure to testify after being granted use immunity. The defendants had
refused to testify on the grounds that they could face federal prosecution.
In State v. Urioste, the court of appeals had reversed a contempt citation
on the grounds that the witness had a valid fifth amendment privilege
because of the possibility of federal prosecution." In Chavez and Boeglin,
the court of appeals quoted Murphy, holding that "the constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination protects a state witness against incrimination under federal as well as state law." 45 A witness given use
immunity is protected from any use of his testimony, including use by
another sovereign. Therefore, fear of federal prosecution resulting from
39. The most common grant of immunity is "use and derivative use" immunity, under which the
government is precluded from using the testimony of the witness or any evidence derived, directly
or indirectly, from that testimony, against the witness. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-6-15 (Repl. Pamp.
1984); N.M. R. Crim. P. 58; N.M. R. Evid. 412. Use and derivative use immunity do not, however,
preclude prosecution of the witness with the use of independently obtained evidence. Transactional
immunity, which precludes prosecution of the witness for the conduct about which he testifies, is
limited to obscure statutory provisions for rarely prosecuted offenses. All of the cases in this section
involve use and derivative use immunity.
40. 100 N.M. 612, 673 P.2d 1345 (Ct. App. 1983).
41. 101 N.M. 567, 686 P.2d 257 (Ct. App. 1984).
42. 95 N.M. 712, 625 P.2d 1229 (Ct.App. 1980).
43. 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
44. 95 N.M. at 715-16, 625 P.2d at 1232-33. The Urioste decision was evidently premised on
the notion that a federal court is not required to apply state rules of privilege. That may be true,
but is irrelevant because fifth amendment rights, rather than rules of privilege, were involved.
45. Chavez, 100 N.M. at 615, 673 P.2d at 1348; Boeglin, 101 N.M. at 568, 686 P.2d at 258;
see Murphy, 378 U.S. at 77-78. The contempt conviction in Chavez was reversed on other grounds.
See infra text accompanying notes 119-123. In Boeglin, the court affirmed its decision applying
Murphy, but reversed the conviction, holding that because the defendant had relied upon Urioste,
he should be allowed an opportunity to answer the questions. Murphy applied the same fairness
consideration, allowing the contemnors the opportunity to answer. Murphy, however, arose in the
context of an inquiry into organized crime by a commission, which presumably still wanted the
answers. Boeglin refused to answer questions in the course of a murder trial which presumably
concluded without his testimony. Though fairness may dictate reversing the conviction, it was not
apparent that any tribunal still wanted his testimony.
Boeglin had also argued that the state should be compelled to seal its file because it could not
use evidence obtained directly or indirectly from the compelled testimony. See supra note 39; Kastigar
v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972). Thus, sealing the file would preserve the status of the state's
knowledge at the time Boeglin's compelled testimony was given. While the court of appeals agreed
that the burden of proof is on the government to prove that its evidence was derived from sources
wholly independent of the compelled testimony, it declined to require sealing of the file. Sealing of
a file or certifying evidence prior to the grant of immunity, however, makes the prosecutor's burden
of proof that the evidence was independently obtained substantially easier. See, e.g., Goldberg v.
United States, 472 F.2d 513 (2nd Cir. 1973).
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compelled statements made in a state court proceeding is not grounds for
refusal to testify.
The next issue was whether a use immunity order immunized the
defendant only for "truthful statements." In yet another State v. Boeglin4
decision, the trial court had held the defendant in contempt following his
refusal to testify after being given a grant of use immunity. The court of
appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the immunity order was
improper because it limited immunity to truthful statements. On certiorari,
the New Mexico Supreme Court held that the limitation was proper. In
reaching its decision, the supreme court reviewed both the obligations of
a witness and the purpose of use immunity. Under Evidence Rule 603"7
a witness is required to take an oath or affirmation declaring he will
"testify truthfully." That obligation applies to all witnesses, including
those whose testimony is compelled.
The supreme court reasoned that a grant of use immunity must be
conditioned on the witness testifying truthfully. The terms of both the
immunity statute48 and applicable evidence rule 49 permit prosecution for
perjury committed while testifying pursuant to a grant of immunity. Because prosecution for perjury is permissible, it follows that a witness is
entitled to immunity only for truthful testimony. Finally, the court noted
that use immunity is coextensive with the fifth amendment privilege and
that the privilege is intended to prevent a person from being compelled
to tell the truth, not to permit the witness to lie.5
In the final "immunity" case, State v. Cheadle,5 the supreme court
concurred with an earlier court of appeals decision holding that a defendant has no authority to demand immunity for a witness. Cheadle was
on trial for murder and related offenses. After resting his case, he moved
to re-open because a defense witness had been located. The trial court
46. 100 N.M. 470, 672 P.2d 643 (1983). Upon affirmance of the conviction by the supreme
court, the case was remanded to the court of appeals for disposition of the remaining issues. That
court reversed. See supra text accompanying notes 41-45 (discussing Boeglin).
47. N.M. R. Evid. 603 provides: "Before testifying, every witness shall be required to declare
that he will testify truthfully, by oath or affirmation administered in a form calculated to awaken his
conscience and impress his mind with his duty to do so."
48. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-6-15 (Repl. Pamp. 1984).
49. N.M. R. Evid. 412 provides:
Evidence compelled under an order requiring testimony or the production of a
record, document or other object notwithstanding a privilege against self incrimination, or any information directly or indirectly derived from such evidence, may
not be used against the person compelled to testify or produce in any criminal
case, except a prosecution for perjury committed in the course of the testimony
or in a contempt proceeding for failing to comply with the order.
50. In Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972), it was recognized that use and derivative
use immunity is coextensive with the protection afforded by the fifth amendment. It has been held
that false testimony, even if compelled by an immunity order, is not protected by the fifth amendment.
See United States v. Tramunti, 500 F.2d 1334 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1079 (1974).
51. 101 N.M. 282, 681 P.2d 708 (1983).
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concurred, but the witness, out of the presence of the jury, invoked his
fifth amendment privilege and refused to answer any questions. The defense requested that the trial court, on its own initiative, grant the witness
immunity and compel his testimony. The trial court refused.
The supreme court noted that neither the immunity statute nor the rule
contemplates a grant of immunity for defense witnesses.52 The rule itself
is predicated upon a written application of the prosecuting attorney. Cheadle made an oral request, and thus did not comply with any portion of
the rule. In any event, the court declined to extend immunity to defense
witnesses."

The defense had urged that under certain circumstances due process
may require that the government afford immunity for a defense witness."
The supreme court rejected that approach and held that there is no authority to demand immunity for a witness by the defense. In so doing,
the supreme court affirmed the earlier decision of the court of appeals in
State v. Sanchez,55 where the court of appeals concluded that a defendant
cannot compel immunization of a witness.56
C. Double Jeopardy
In a triad of appeals raising the same issue, the New Mexico Supreme
Court decided that the jurisdictional exception to the double jeopardy
52. Id. at 286, 681 P.2d at 712.
53. In its discussion of use immunity, the court either confused use immunity with transactional
immunity, or else subtly eliminated use immunity. The court stated that the N.M. R. Crim. P. 58
immunity order "must also contain a specific condition that New Mexico will forego the prosecution
of the person for criminal conduct about which he is questioned and testifies." 101 N.M. at 286,
681 P.2d at 712. That is, of course, the definition of transactional immunity. See supra note 39. A
1980 amendment to Rule 58 makes the rule applicable only to use and derivative use immunity, not
to transactional immunity. The court cited Campos v. State, 91 N.M. 745, 580 P.2d 966 (1978), in
support of its characterization of the contents of the order, but Campos was clearly a transactional
immunity case; it did not involve use and derivative use immunity. It may well be that, because the
court was discussing immunity generally, concepts inherent in the two different types of immunity
were unintentionally intertwined.
54. The leading case in this context is Government of Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964 (3rd
Cir. 1980). This case suggests that a form of judicial immunity should be required if four circumstances are present: (1) a proper application; (2) the defense witness is available; (3) the testimony
is clearly exculpatory and essential to the defendant's case; and (4) there is no strong government
interest which countervails against a grant of immunity. While Virgin Islands has been widely
commented upon, it has not been widely followed. See Comment, Defense Witness Immunity and
the Right to a Fair Trial, 129 U. Pa. L. Rev. 377 (1980).
55. 98 N.M. 428, 649 P.2d 496 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 98 N.M. 478, 649 P.2d 1391 (1982).
56. Id. Most other jurisdictions and federal courts have concluded that a defendant cannot compel
immunization of a witness. See Annot., 4 A.L.R.4th 617 (1981). But see United States v. Lord,
711 F.2d 887 (9th Cir. 1983); People v. Owens, 97 A.D.2d 855, 469 N.Y.S.2d 249 (App. Div.
1984). The primary problem with a defendant compelling immunization is practical; it effectively
precludes prosecution of the witness. The prosecutor has the burden of proving evidence against an
immunized witness was independently obtained. See supra note 45. Meeting the burden can be
difficult. Clever use of immunized witnesses by a defendant in a severed trial involving multiple
defendants could preclude prosecution of all but the first defendant.
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provision of the fifth amendment is still valid.57 The jurisdictional exception provides that if a court, such as a magistrate court, does not have
jurisdiction to try the entire case, jeopardy does not attach.5" Under New
Mexico law, a magistrate court does not have jurisdiction to try a felony. 9
Thus, the jurisdictional exception allows prosecution for felony offenses
even though misdemeanors arising out of the same occurrence have resulted in convictions in inferior courts."
In State v. Manzanares,6 ' the defendant pled guilty in magistrate court
to numerous traffic offenses, including reckless driving and driving while
under the influence of an intoxicating liquor. He then raised a double
jeopardy defense to his indictment for vehicular homicide in district court.
On interlocutory appeal, the court of appeals reversed the denial of the
motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds; that decision, in turn,
was reversed by the New Mexico Supreme Court.
The court of appeals had reversed the denial on the premise that the
jurisdictional exception had been abandoned by the United States Supreme
Court.62 The New Mexico Supreme Court rejected that argument, but it
did allude to alternatives to the jurisdictional exception.63 The court was
clearly motivated by the "abuse which could result when a defendant
pleads guilty to lesser offenses in a court without jurisdiction to hear a
felony charge" if the jurisdictional exception were eliminated.64 While
57. State v. Padilla, 101 N.M. 58, 678 P.2d 686 (1984), cert. granted sub nom. Fugate v. New
Mexico, 105 S. Ct. 81 (1984), reversing 101 N.M. 78, 678 P.2d 706 (Ct. App. 1983) and State v.
Fugate, 101 N.M. 82, 678 P.2d 710 (Ct. App. 1983); State v. Manzanares, 100 N.M. 621, 674
P.2d 511 (1983).
58. State v. Tanton, 88 N.M. 333, 540 P.2d 813 (1975).
59. State v. Mann, 94 N.M. 276, 609 P.2d 723 (1980).
60. Presumably, collateral estoppel would preclude prosecution of felony charges after prosecution
of included misdemeanors results in an acquittal in a lower court. Cf. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S.
436 (1970); State v. Tanton, 88 N.M. 333, 540 P.2d 813 (1975).
61. 100 N.M. 621, 674 P.2d 511 (1983).
62. The court of appeals relied heavily on the argument that because the jurisdictional exception
had not been applied by the United States Supreme Court since Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S.
442 (1912), it was no longer good law.
63. Indeed, in a case decided after Manzanares, the United States Supreme Court was presented
with a similar issue. In Thigpen v. Roberts, 104 S.Ct. 2916 (1984), the defendant had been convicted
of reckless driving, driving while intoxicated, and related offenses. He appealed and received a trial
de novo, in a procedure similar to New Mexico's. The state then charged him with manslaughter,
and he was duly convicted. The Court disposed of the case on the premise that the felony charge
subsequent to the appeal established a presumption of unconstitutional prosecutorial vindictiveness
under Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974). The dissents in Thigpen addressed the double
jeopardy issues, with Justice O'Connor advancing the argument that jeopardy should not attach in
the first stage of a two-tier system providing for trial de novo on appeal. 104 S. Ct. at 2923 (O'Connor,
J., dissenting).
64. 100 N.M. at 624, 674 P.2d at 514. This is a significant practical problem in a judicial scheme
which provides for concurrent jurisdiction over some offenses by different courts. District courts,
for example, as courts of general jurisdiction, have jurisdiction over misdemeanor offenses as well
as felonies. The practical problems are further exacerbated by municipal courts, which allow prosecutions by the municipality rather than the state. The Manzanares opinion mentions a "modicum
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the jurisdictional exception remains the law in New Mexico, it may be
susceptible to challenge in the federal system.
IV. THE SIXTH AMENDMENT
A. Effective Assistance of Counsel
Two survey cases raised novel theories of ineffective assistance of
counsel. In the first, State v. White,6 5 the defendant argued that he was
afflicted with ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial attorney
was not admitted to practice in New Mexico. The defendant had retained
an El Paso attorney, -licensed in Texas but not New Mexico, to represent
him on drug-related offenses. The Texas attorney associated with New
Mexico counsel, who neither participated in the proceedings nor was
excused from doing so.6 No claim was directed to any specific conduct
of the trial attorney. The argument was that representation by an attorney
who was not licensed in New Mexico was ineffective per se.
The court of appeals examined two lines of cases involving unlicensed
attorneys. The first determined that there is ineffective assistance when
the purported attorney is not a lawyer or where the failure to obtain
licensure is related to inability to pass a bar examination, want of moral
character, or similar disabilities.67 The second looked at the nature of the
failure to obtain licensure and, by applying a due process analysis, determined whether the disability warranted relief.6"
In concluding that there had been no violation of the defendant's sixth
amendment right to effective assistance of counsel, the court of appeals
declined to apply a per se ineffective assistance of counsel rule. Instead,
it paid close attention to the facts, of the case. The attorney in question
was licensed in Texas and other states, had extensive trial experience,
had retained local counsel, and had apparently committed no errors,
tactical or otherwise. The court refused to find ineffective assistance of
counsel in the absence of any showing of prejudice.
of cooperation between prosecutors" as one possible solution. Id. While lack of cooperation may
be a problem, a more common problem is the absence of any prosecutor in misdemeanor cases,
particularly where the defendant is not represented by counsel. Often the defendant is the only player
who knows what is happening, and it is not necessarily in his or her best interest to share the
knowledge.
65. 101 N.M. 310, 681 P.2d 736 (Ct.App. 1984). In re Palafox, 100 N.M. 563, 673 P.2d 1296
(1983), is a companion case.
66. N.M. R. Crim. P. 53.1 provides that nonadmitted counsel must associate with admitted
counsel and that admitted counsel, "unless excused by the court, must be present in person in all
proceedings before the court." There was a violation of Rule 53.1, for which both counsel were
held in contempt in the companion case, In re Palafox, 100 N.M. 563, 673 P.2d 1296 (1983).
67. See Solina v. United States, 709 F.2d 160 (2d Cir. 1983); People v. Felder, 47 N.Y.2d 287,
391 N.E.2d 1274, 418 N.Y.S.2d 295 (1979). In Solina, the court specifically held that the sixth
amendment required "licensed" counsel, but that technical defects in licensed status would not
necessarily be a sixth amendment violation.
68. See Wilson v. People, 652 P.2d 595 (Colo. 1982).
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In State v. Hernandez,69 the New Mexico Supreme Court explored the
limits of conflicts of interest. The defendant was represented by an attorney who, the day of trial, became a partner with the attorney who had
represented a co-defendant in the same case. The co-defendant had pled
and promised to testify against Hernandez. The trial court refused to
allow the attorney to withdraw the morning of trial, and the court of
appeals reversed on the grounds that a possible conflict existed and that
it was not necessary to show actual prejudice.
On certiorari, the supreme court held that there must be an actual
conflict of interest. In other words, counsel, or the firm with which counsel
is associated, must actively represent conflicting interests.7" The law partnership did not exist when the co-defendant entered into a plea agreement.
Further, Hernandez was not represented by his trial attorney at the time
the co-defendant pled. The court held that the conflict was too slight to
permit a finding of active representation of conflicting interests.
B. Confrontation of Witnesses
In State v. Worley,7 a prosecution witness refused to testify under a
grant of immunity and was held in contempt.72 On appeal, the defendant
argued two issues: first, that he had been prejudiced by the inferences
flowing from the failure of the witness to testify; and second, that he had
been denied his right to confront witnesses.
During the defendant's trial, the prosecution called the same recalcitrant
witness, a co-defendant, as a rebuttal witness and questioned him about
inculpatory testimony he gave at his earlier trial. The prosecutor asked
if the witness had made a particular answer to a question, reading the
answer to the witness, but the witness refused to acknowledge making
the statement. Given the strength of the state's case and the relative
unimportance of the evidence elicited by reading statements from a prior
trial, the court did not find prejudice. 73 The supreme court held that the
69. 100 N.M. 501, 672 P.2d 1132 (1983).
70. In State v. Robinson, 99 N.M. 674, 662 P.2d 1341 (1983) the court discussed the potential
for a conflict of interest when two attorneys, who are associated, represent respectively a defendant
and a co-defendant turned prosecution witness. Because the defendant in Robinson was not represented at the time the co-defendant entered into negotiations with the state, the court declined to
find an actual conflict of interest and did not find actual prejudice.
71. 100 N.M. 720, 676 P.2d 247 (1984).
72. The recalcitrant witness was Carl Case, who had been earlier convicted of murder in the
same case. His contempt for failure to testify is discussed infra notes 127-38 and accompanying
text.
73. The court also noted that the statements used by the prosecutor derived from the testimony
of the witness in open court in the witness' own trial, and thus "carried more of an indicia of
reliability." 100 N.M. at 726, 676 P.2d at 253. While reliability may be a rationale for the right of
confrontation, the right nonetheless is independently significant. It is not clear what importance is
to be attached to the reliability of the challenged testimony.
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admonitions and instructions given by the trial court were sufficient to
cure any error caused by knowledge of the co-defendant's guilt.
On the confrontation issue, the court held that even if the limited
testimony given by the witness was untested by cross-examination, it did
not rise to the level of reversible error. Applying the standard devised in
Namet v. United States,74 the court determined that the failure of the
witness to respond to defense questions did not, even inferentially, add
new evidence. All that could be drawn from the witness's refusal to testify
was cumulative of other evidence, and thus the failure of the witness to
testify did not add "critical weight" to the evidence.
V. RIGHT TO DISQUALIFICATION OF A JUDGE
In a case with implications far beyond the criminal field, the New
Mexico Supreme Court virtually eliminated the "right" to disqualify a
district court judge. State ex rel. Gesswein v. Galvan75 started when an
assistant district attorney filed a "notice of peremptory disqualification"
of Judge Joe H. Galvan in accordance with Rule 34.1 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure. 76 Judge Galvan denied effect to the state's purported
disqualification, and the state responded by filing an original petition for
a writ of prohibition with the supreme court.
The opinion itself framed two issues. The central issue was whether
the statute involving a right to disqualification77 created a substantive right
or was procedural in nature. The second issue, though never really addressed, was whether either the statute or rule violated the state constitutional right to disqualify a judge.78 With these issues in mind, the court
74. 373 U.S. 179 (1963).
75. 100 N.M. 769, 676 P.2d 1334 (1984).
76. The history of the procedure utilized to disqualify a judge is itself instructive. The disqualification statute, N.M. Stat. Ann. § 38-3-9 (1978), speaks of an affidavit by a party stating that the
assigned judge cannot preside with impartiality. At least one case appeared to hold that the affidavit
must be signed by a party and that any deviance from the proscribed form constituted grounds to
set the affidavit aside. See Coca v. New Mexico Health & Social Servs. Dep't, 89 N.M. 558, 555
P.2d 381 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 90 N.M. 8, 558 P.2d 620 (1976). Yet, in 1982, the supreme
court adopted N.M. R. Crim. P. 34.1, creating a "notice of peremptory disqualification" which
could be signed by an attorney, and which required only a statement that the party was electing to
exercise his statutory right of disqualification. The rule was, in part, a response to the realization
that affidavits of disqualification were routinely signed by litigants who were without any personal
knowledge of the judge, but were following their counsel's strategic suggestions. The rule thus
conformed practice to the reality of the situation.
77. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 38-3-9 (1978) provides, in pertinent part:
Whenever a party to an action or proceeding, civil or criminal, . . . shall make
and file an affidavit that the judge before whom the action or proceeding is to be
tried and heard . . . cannot, according to the belief of the party making the
affidavit, preside over the action or proceeding with impartiality, that judge shall
proceed no further.
78. N.M. Const. art. VI, § 18, provides:
No justice, judge or magistrate of any court shall, except by consent of all parties,
sit in any cause in which either of the parties are related to him by affinity or
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reviewed the history of the disqualification statute in New Mexico and
the variety of ways in which the right to disqualification has been characterized.
The right to a fair and impartial trial was of primary importance to the
disqualification analysis. Having established the right to a fair and impartial tribunal as the substantive right, it was then easy to characterize
disqualification as procedural on the basis that "substantive law creates,
defines, or regulates rights while procedural law outlines the means for
enforcing those rights and obtaining redress." 79 The problem facing the
court, however, was that previous case law had established that the statutory right to disqualification was substantive.8 0 The court examined the
rationale of the earlier cases "in light of present day circumstances."81
In holding the disqualification statute to be procedural in nature, the court
concluded that it "can adopt a rule of procedure when the operation of
the court is involved and the existing process has created a problem." 2
In its conclusion, the court retracted Rule 34.1.s" The "ever increasing
number of disqualifications" led the court to conclude that the statute and
rule presented an "unreasonable burden on the system."8 4 The statute
consanguinity within the degree of first cousin, or in which he was counsel, or
in the trial of which he presided in any inferior court, or in which he has an
interest.
Nothing in the constitutional provision suggests how or why a disqualification statute or rule allowing
disqualification on additional grounds would violate the constitutional provision, and thus render the
statute or rule invalid or unenforceable. The opinion itself did not address the issue. It is hard to
see how a constitutional provision setting minimum standards is violated by the adoption of statutes
or rules setting higher standards. Indeed, it happens frequently. See, e.g., Schmerber v. California,
384 U.S. 757 (1966), and State v. Wilson, 92 N.M. 54, 582 P.2d 826 (Ct. App. 1978) (involving
statutory implied consent laws imposing a higher standard than that constitutionally required).
79. 100 N.M. at 770, 676 P.2d at 1335.
80. Gerety v. Demers, 92 N.M. 396, 589 P.2d 180 (1978), Beall v. Reidy, 80 N.M. 444, 457
P.2d 376 (1969), and State ex rel. Hannah v. Armijo, 38 N.M. 73, 28 P.2d 511 (1933), can be read
as recognizing a substantive, as opposed to procedural, right.
81. 100 N.M. at 771, 676 P.2d at 1336. It is one thing to hold that earlier cases were wrong. It
is something entirely different to hold that statutory disqualification was a substantive right in 1933,
but had devolved into a procedural right by 1984. The problem may be with the artificial nature of
the substantive/procedural construct. As the court recognized, the difference between substantive
law and procedural law "can be difficult to define." Id. at 772, 676 P.2d at 1337.
82. Id. at 772, 676 P.2d at 1337.
83. See supra note 76 (discussing N.M. R. Crim. P. 34.1). Because the writ was issued in a
pending case, the court held it was prohibited from applying new rules to the case at bar. 100 N.M.
at 773, 676 P.2d at 1338; see N.M. Const. art. IV, § 34. The petitioner won the battle, but presumably
lost the war.
84. 100 N.M. at 773, 676 P.2d at 1338. Immediately following the retraction of Rule 34.1, the
court adopted a new Rule 34.1, effective March 5, 1984. By the terms of the implementation order,
it applies to all cases filed on or after the effective date. The rule essentially eliminates disqualification
as of right by requiring that the affidavit of disqualification "state sufficient facts showing the bias,
prejudice or interest of the judge being disqualified" and by requiring that counsel certify to the
truth of the facts. The rule also allows the judge to determine the sufficiency of the factual allegations
of bias, prejudice, or interest. This too is contrary to prior practice. See State ex rel. Hannah v.
Armijo, 38 N.M. 73, 28 P.2d 511 (1933). New Mexico thus joins the federal system and numerous
states in allowing disqualification only in limited circumstances. See, e.g., Comment, Meeting the
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was thus presumably subject to modification by adoption of a superseding
rule by the court.8 5
VI. SENTENCING
A. Aggravating Circumstances
The determinate sentencing law in New Mexico provides for increasing
the basic sentence by up to one-third upon a finding by the court of
"aggravating circumstances surrounding the offense or concerning the offender." 86 The constitutionality of this scheme was finally laid to rest
in State v. Segotta.87 David 0. Mead and Lisa Jeanette Segotta were
convicted in a joint trial of second degree murder, with Segotta additionally convicted of solicitation to commit murder. They pursued separate
appeals, with separate decisions rendered by the court of appeals, but the
cases were again consolidated by the New Mexico Supreme Court. The
court of appeals held the aggravating sentence statute unconstitutional;
the supreme court reversed the court of appeals."
The court of appeals conducted an exhaustive analysis of the statute
-and the applicable constitutional standard. Focusing primarily upon a
perceived lack of standards or guidelines for determining whether alteration of the basic sentence is appropriate, the court held that the statute
was void for vagueness. The court appeared to reject a strict, mechanistic
scheme limiting the trial court to specific exclusive criteria in determining
whether aggravation is proper, while also holding that the legislature must
give some definite guidelines.
The supreme court gave the arguments advanced by the court of appeals
short shrift. Given the context of the entire sentencing scheme and the
role of judicial discretion in sentencing, it held that the aggravation sentencing statute was not unconstitutionally vague. The court then enumerated a list of proper mitigating or aggravating circumstances, taking
Challenge: Rethinking JudicialDisqualification, 69 Calif. L. Rev. 1445 (1981); Report, Disqualification of Judges for Prejudiceor Bias--Common Law Evolution, Current Status, and the Oregon
Experience, 48 Or. L. Rev. 311 (1969); Note, Disqualification of Judges for Bias in the Federal
Courts, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 1435 (1966). A similar rule of civil procedure, N.M. R. Civ. P. 88.1, was
adopted atthe same time as the new criminal rule. But see infra note 169.
allows
85. The court's definition of "procedural" law as the means for enforcing substantive rights
it to invoke its rule-making power at will.. The definition also raises significant separation of powers
issues beyond the scope of this Article.
86. N.M. Stat. Ann. §31-18-15.1 (Repl. Pamp. 1981).
87. 100 N.M.498, 672 P.2d 1129 (1983).
88. The court of appeals decisions were State v.Segotta, 100 N.M. 18, 665 P.2d 280 (Ct.App.
1983), and State v.Mead, 100 N.M. 27, 665 P.2d 289 (Ct. App. 1983). The supreme court noted
that similar arguments had been previously rejected by the court of appeals in State v. Wilson, 97
N.M. 534, 641 P.2d 1081 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 98 N.M. 50, 644 P.2d 1039 (1982), and that
the court of appeals had failed to even consider its own decision in Wilson.
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care to note that trial courts are not limited to the listed factors.8 9
The supreme court opinion left many questions unanswered. For example, the court of appeals had raised the issue of the standard for the
burden of proof of aggravating circumstances. It also noted that issues
of both the burden of persuasion and the burden of production were
implicated.' The court of appeals further enunciated a laundry list of
additional due process questions even though they were not raised by the
defendant. These included whether the prosecutor must give advance
notice of the specific aggravating circumstances intended to be offered,
whether the defendant can confront and cross-examine witnesses at the
sentencing hearing, and whether illegally obtained evidence can be considered at a sentencing hearing.
B. Increase in Penalty Following Appeal
For the first time, New Mexico appellate courts addressed issues involved in a trial court imposing a harsher sentence following a successful
appeal. In State v. Cordova,9 ' the defendant successfully appealed his
conviction for aggravated battery, for which he received a three-year
suspended sentence and two years of probation and was ordered to pay
probation costs and $175.00 each month as restitution. After remand, he
was again convicted. The trial judge imposed a sentence of three years
incarceration followed by parole. The stated reason for change of the
sentence was "due to defendant's failure to make restitution with the
exception of one payment.'92
The court of appeals considered the due process issue. Under North
Carolina v. Pearce,93 due process requires that a defendant should be free
to appeal without fear of retaliatory or vindictive punishment. Pearce
adopted a test requiring judges to state their reasons for imposing a more
severe sentence after a new trial. Further, the reasons must be based upon
events subsequent to the initial sentence.'
89. The court held that the factors a trial court may consider as mitigating or aggravating include:
unusual aspects of the defendant's character; past conduct; age; health; any events surrounding the
crime; a pattern of conduct indicating whether the defendant is a serious threat to society; and the
possibility of rehabilitation. 100 N.M. at 501, 665 P.2d at 1132.
90. There is, as the court of appeals noted, a split among the federal circuits on the issue of
whether the government or the defendant has the burden of going forward once a defendant challenges
the accuracy of information in a presentence report. Compare United States v. Weston, 448 F.2d
626 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1061 (1972) (holding that it is unfair to place the burden
of proving the falsity of a challenged presentence report information on the defendant), with United
States v. Battaglia, 478 F.2d 854 (5th Cir. 1972) (reaching a contrary result).
91. 100 N.M. 643, 674 P.2d 533 (Ct. App. 1983).
92. Id. at 647, 674 P.2d at 537.
93. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
94. Wasman v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 3217 (1984).
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In its analysis, the court of appeals determined that the defendant had
no obligation, other than moral, to pay restitution during the pendency
of the appeal. Applying the Pearcetest, the court held that failure to pay
restitution where judgment was stayed pending appeal was not a proper
"justifying circumstance" for increasing the initial sentence. Consequently, the case was remanded for sentencing in accordance with the
original sentence.
In State v. Lopez,95 the court of appeals held that the total sentence of
incarceration was the test for vindictiveness and that no due process right
was implicated where actual punishment had not increased. The defendant
had initially appealed his sentences for two second offense armed robberies with second offense firearm enhancements and several other offenses.' 6 Altogether, he had received a twenty-one year sentence. The
court of appeals had found the decision to treat defendant as a second
offender to be improper and remanded the case.
The trial court then resentenced the defendant, imposing a total of
nineteen years imprisonment. Even though the total sentence of incarceration was less, a due process claim was raised because counts which
had earlier been concurrent were now consecutive. 97 The court of appeals
rejected the contention that changing counts from concurrent to consecutive was evidence of judicial vindictiveness. Instead, the court focused
on the "actual effect of the new sentence as a whole on the total amount
of punishment." 9 8 Applying this standard, the new sentence did not violate
due process principles.
The final case in this area involved permissible sentences on appeal
de novo from metropolitan court to district court. By statute, a defendant
can appeal a conviction in metropolitan court and receive a new trial in
district court.' The defendant in State v. Haar"° did just that; he was
95. 99 N.M. 612, 661 P.2d 890 (Ct. App. 1983).
96. The initial appeal was unreported. Second offense armed robbery is a first degree felony,
punishable by 18 years in prison, while first offense armed robbery is a second degree felony,
punishable by nine years. N.M. Stat. Ann. §30-16-2 (Repl. Pamp. 1984); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 3118-15 (Repl. Pamp. 1981). A second or subsequent use of a firearm in the commission of a felony
results in a mandatory three-year enhancement; first use results in a mandatory one-year enhancement.
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-18-16 (Repl. Pamp. 1981).
97. The trial court ordered that the nine-year sentences for robbery be served consecutively, but
that the one-year firearm enhancements on each count be served concurrently. The sentence was
technically improper, because the firearm enhancement increases a sentence and is not severable.
The effect of the sentence was either to run one of the enhancements concurrent to the basic sentence,
rather than treating the sentence for each count as a unitary whole, or else to have the two sentences
"overlap" by one year. See, e.g., State v. Mayberry, 97 N.M. 760, 643 P.2d 629 (Ct. App. 1982).
As the court of appeals noted, the defendant did not challenge the length or arrangement of his
sentences.
98. 99 N.M. at 613, 661 P.2d at 891. See also United States v. Markus, 603 F.2d 409 (2nd. Cir.
1979).
99. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 34-8A-6 (Repl. Pamp. 1981).
100. 100 N.M. 609, 673 P.2d 1342 (Ct. App. 1983). Mr. Haar has almost single-handedly
developed the law in the area of de novo appeals. In addition to this case, Mr. Haar was the defendant
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rewarded with a net increase of thirty days on his jail sentence. The court
of appeals held that since a district court does not have specific statutory
authority to increase the sentence, it could not. " In an interesting twist,
the state had argued on appeal that the initial sentence was void because
it had included a probationary term as well as incarceration and the
metropolitan court had no specific statutory authority to impose probation.
The court rejected that argument, reasoning that the correctness of the
metropolitan court sentence was not being reviewed and that only the
propriety of the district court's increased sentence was at issue.'o2
C. Sentencing Procedures
In State v. Diaz,0 3 the New Mexico Supreme Court established that a
sentence is not final until formally entered. The defendant in Diaz was
orally sentenced to a suspended sentence and probation. After sentencing,
but prior to entry of the judgment, he was reported by a deputy sheriff
to have made comments which were "disrespectful to the trial court.""
At a motion to reconsider the sentence, the defendant received the same
sentence, with the exception that no portion of it was suspended. The
court of appeals reversed the imposition of the second sentence, holding
that a sentence was final when orally pronounced and that double jeopardy
precluded any increase of sentence. 0 5 In summarily reversing the decision, the supreme court held that an oral pronouncement of sentence by
a judge in a criminal case is not a final judgment."
In a case clearly calling for legislative action, State v. Chavez" 7 held
in an earlier case, State v. Haar, 94 N.M. 539, 612 P.2d 1350 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
1063 (1980), which established the proposition that the district court on appeal de novo has only
such jurisdiction as has been authorized by statute and cannot increase the sentence absent statutory
authority. In a companion case to his earlier conviction, Haar v. Hanrahan, 708 F.2d 1547 (10th
Cir. 1983), the court held that a defendant does not have a right to trial by jury on appeal de novo
where the de novo court cannot impose a greater sentence than the initial court and a sentence of
not over six months is involved.
101. The statute providing for trial de novo on appeal from metropolitan court, N.M. Stat. Ann.
§ 34-8A-6 (Repl. Pamp. 1981), is silent on the sentence on appeal. The case thus fell under the rule
of the first Haar decision, 94 N.M. 539, 612 P.2d 1350. That case was decided prior to the
establishment of the metropolitan court. In apparent response to the first Haardecision, the legislature
amended the magistrate court appeal statute, N.M. Stat. Ann. §35-13-2 (Cum. Supp. 1984), to
allow an increase in sentence on appeal, but did not make the same change in the parallel metropolitan
court statute.
102. The issue has presumably been rendered moot by the amendments to N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 3119-1, 31-20-5, and 31-20-6 (Cum. Supp. 1984), which specifically authorize magistrate and metropolitan courts to impose probation as a condition of suspending a sentence.
103. 100 N.M. 524, 673 P.2d 501 (1983).
104. Id.
105. Id. The double jeopardy argument was predicated, in part, on the fact that defendant had
already completed a portion of his sentence by paying restitution prior to the resentencing hearing.
106. 100 N.M. at 526, 673 P.2d at 502. The double jeopardy objection was answered by reference
to the record, which indicated that the checks which were issued for restitution were voided because
of clerical errors. Thus, restitution was not actually paid at the time of resentencing.
107. 100 N.M. 750, 676 P.2d 827 (Ct. App. 1984).
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that upon revocation of probation a court cannot impose additional conditions of probation. Relying heavily on a prior case," °8 the court held
that under the applicable statute,' °9 a court has only two options once a
violation of probation is established: continue or revoke probation. This
was true even if the defendant is willing to waive all double jeopardy
protection and submit to the additional condition. As the court held, under
the statute "trial courts continue to be deprived of the discretionary power
to apply common sense solutions to probation violations."" 0 The ball
now appears to be in the legislature's court.
VII. NEW TRIAL STANDARD
Another case entitled State v. Chavez"' addressed the issue of whether
a trial court can weigh the evidence and the credibility of witnesses in
determining whether to grant a new trial. "' In the initial appeal of this
case, the New Mexico Supreme Court set down general guidelines for
granting a new trial and remanded the case for consideration in light of
those guidelines." 3 On remand, the trial court again granted a new trial,
and the appeal ensued.
Criminal Procedure Rule 45 allows a court to grant a new trial "if
required in the interests of justice. ""4 On remand after the initial appeal,
the trial court made specific factual findings concerning the trial. These
included findings that the convictions for first degree murder were against
the overwhelming weight of the evidence, that there were significant and
irreconcilable conflicts in the testimony of the witnesses, and that the
instructions as given, which included both premeditated first degree murder and depraved mind first degree murder, were confusing to the jury.
Based upon these findings, the trial court again granted a new trial, and
the court of appeals again affirmed.
On certiorari, the New Mexico Supreme Court framed the question in
terms of the role to be played by the trial judge. The decision of the court
of appeals, in affirming the trial court, was characterized by the supreme
court as permitting the trial judge to "sit in judgment of a criminal case
as the proverbial thirteenth juror.""' The supreme court rejected this
108. State v. Crespin, 96 N.M. 640, 633 P.2d 1238 (Ct. App. 1981).
109. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-21-15(B) (Repl. Pamp. 1981).
110. 100 N.M. at 751, 676 P.2d at 828.
111. 101 N.M. 136, 679 P.2d 804 (1984) (Chavez II). The same case was involved in an earlier
appeal involving the right to a new trial. See State v. Chavez, 98 N.M. 682, 652 P.2d 232 (1982)

(Chavez I).
112. The procedure followed in a motion for a new trial is set forth in N.M. R. Crim. P. 45.
113. Chavez 1, 98 N.M. at 684, 652 P.2d at 234 (1982). The court recognized that granting a
new trial was discretionary, but required that the grounds upon which a new trial is sought or granted
must be specified so that the decision can be reviewed for abuse of discretion and legal sufficiency.
114. N.M. R. Crim. P. 45.
115. 101 N.M. at 138, 679 P.2d at 806 (emphasis in original).

Spring 19851

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

approach and specifically held that the trial court abused its discretion in
weighing the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses.
On the issue of confusing instructions, the supreme court held that,
because the instructions given were supreme court approved, the court
of appeals had "no authority to set the instructions aside.116 The supreme
court also determined that the trial court's disagreement with "the required
manner of instructing the jury is not an appropriate ground upon which
a new trial may be granted, if those instructions are approved by this
Court."" 7 The supreme court thus disposed of the issue without ever
addressing the merits. " 8
VIII. CONTEMPT

Characterizing contempt as either direct or indirect continues to puzzle
both courts and practitioners. The distinction is critical because due process procedural requirements exist for indirect contempt.
A. Indirect Contempt
In yet another case entitled State v. Chavez, "9 the issue on appeal was
whether summary disposition of contempt for refusal to testify before a
grand jury was proper. The defendant refused to answer questions before
a grand jury and persisted in his refusal even after being granted use
' Finally, a district court judge ordered him to testify or "suffer
immunity. 20
the consequences." Upon his representation that he would not testify, the
defendant was sentenced to sixty days' imprisonment. The court of appeals
2
characterized the contempt as criminal. '

116. Id. at 139, 679 P.2d at 807.
117. Id.
118. It is entirely arguable that the issue could be raised on direct appeal, and the court was
simply holding that the issue was not an appropriate one for a Rule 45 motion. While Chavez I
recognized that the standard for granting a new trial is whether the new trial is "in the interest of
justice", it is unclear what that standard means in light of Chavez I1.
A trial judge appears to have limited authority to grant a new trial, particularly on grounds related
to the proof of the offense. See State v. Davis, 97 N.M. 745, 643 P.2d 614 (Ct. App. 1982)
(establishing that a judge could not determine a motion for directed verdict after submission of the
case to the jury). Chavez II seems to establish that a trial court has the same authority after a verdict
as does an appellate court-if it is supported by substantial evidence, the verdict is unassailable.
See supra note 34.
119. 100 N.M. 612, 673 P.2d 1345 (Ct. App. 1983).
120. The case was unusual. Chavez had been earlier charged with drug-related offenses. At his
defense. At the close of the case, the prosecution dismissed the charges, and
he raised an alibi
trial,
Chavez was thus discharged. The grand jury then commenced investigating possible perjury charges
against one of the witnesses who had testified at the defendant's trial. See supra notes 39-45 and
accompanying text.
121. Criminal contempt is intended as punishment; it is distinguished from civil contempt, which
is intended to coerce the contemnor into a desired course of conduct. The distinction is largely
pragmatic; a contemnor may purge himself of civil contempt by complying with the court order,
but criminal contempt cannot be purged. Characterization of contempt as criminal or civil appears
to have little bearing on whether the contempt is direct or indirect.
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As a general rule, a judgment of direct contempt is supportable only
if the defendant can be punished summarily.' 22 The court of appeals held
that summary punishment for a witness who refuses to testify before a
grand jury is improper.123 The lack of an open, serious. threat to orderly
procedure precludes the need for summary punishment. A grand jury is
an ongoing body, as opposed to a trial jury, and therefore delay is not as
critical. An order of contempt for failure to testify before a grand jury is
thus indirect and cannot be treated summarily.
In State v. Stout, 24
' the New Mexico Supreme Court reversed the per
se rule, previously adopted in Wollen v. State,125 requiring a new judge
for a contempt where the judge is the accuser. Stout involved an indirect
contempt, arising from an attorney's failure to appear at a sentencing
hearing which had been rescheduled at his request. The judge before
whom Stout was to have appeared initiated the contempt proceeding by
ordering Stout to show cause why he should not be held in contempt and
proceeded to hear the contempt. The case squarely fell within the per se
Wollen rule.
The court advanced several arguments for modifying Wollen, including
maintenance of judicial dignity and authority as well as waste of judicial
resources. In place of the per se rule, the court adopted a rule holding
that a judge is precluded from hearing a case only when the judge "has
become so embroiled in the controversy that he cannot fairly and objectively hear the case, or when he or one of his staff will necessarily be a
witness in the proceeding. "'2 6
B. "Direct" or "Summary" Contempt
In State v. Case,'27 the defendant was held in contempt for failure to
answer questions during a trial. The defendant had been convicted of
murder and criminal sexual penetration. Following his conviction, he was
called as a witness in the trial of another person charged with related
crimes. Case was granted use immunity, but refused to testify about certain
122. Numerous cases have elaborated the procedural requirements for an indirect contempt. See,
e.g., State v. Diamond, 94 N.M. 118, 607 P.2d 656 (Ct. App. 1980). The terminology used in
characterizing contempts is not always precise. "Direct contempt" is frequently used to refer to
contempts which may be punished summarily, though it appears that not all contemptuous acts which
occur in the presence of the judge may be treated summarily. See, e.g., Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S.
488 (1974).
123. 100 N.M. at 614, 673 P.2d at 1347. The court of appeals relied primarily on a United States
Supreme Court case, Harris v. United States, 382 U.S. 162 (1965), which also held that summary
punishment for refusal to testify before a grand jury was improper.
124. 100 N.M. 472, 672 P.2d 645 (1983).
125. 86 N.M. 1, 518 P.2d 960 (1974).
126. 100 N.M. at 475, 672 P.2d at 648. The rule adopted is the majority rule, best enunciated
in Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971).
127. 100 N.M. 173, 667 P.2d 978 (Ct. App. 1983).
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events relating to the homicide. The trial court then held Case in contempt
ten separate times, based upon ten different questions, and sentenced him
to one year for each contempt, with the sentence to be served consecutively.
The first issue on appeal concerned the appropriateness of summary
adjudication of the contempt and the one-year sentences. Citing United
' the court of appeals concluded that refusal to testify
States v. Wilson, 28
is a proper matter to be dealt with summarily. The number of contempts
charged, however, was held improper. A witness can be held in contempt
only once for refusing to testify about a subject of inquiry. 2 9 Thus all
contempts necessarily merged into one. The court of appeals also reversed
the one-year sentence, because a sentence in excess of six months cannot
30
be imposed absent a jury trial or waiver of a jury trial. '
The second issue involved the contemnor's right to counsel. Case had
been held in contempt on two questions prior to the arrival of his attorney.
As a general proposition, any defendant who receives a jail sentence has
a right to counsel:"" The state urged that the general rule did not apply
' In holding that
because of the special nature of summary contempt. 32
there is no right to counsel for summary contempt, the court considered
the competing interests' and determined that the necessity for summary
proceedings was of primary importance."'
The final issue involved the right to present defenses. In disposing of
this issue, the court of appeals held that a contemnor does have a right
128. 421 U.S. 309 (1975).
129. Since all questions which Case refused to answer were characterized as directed to the
homicide, the court reserved ruling on whether there could be more than one contempt if a witness
refused to answer questions on "more than one subject of inquiry." 100 N.M. at 175, 661 P.2d at
980. The construct seems artificial, since "subject of inquiry" is a category with obvious elastic
compass.
130. In Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488 (1974), the Supreme Court recognized a sixth amendment
to trial by jury in contempt cases where the actual sentence imposed exceeded six months. The
right
contempt situation is unique; in all other cases it is the potential sentence, rather than the actual
sentence, which governs the right to trial by jury. Cf. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
131. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), established the proposition that a person cannot
be imprisoned for any offense, including a petty misdemeanor, unless represented by counsel at his
trial or unless the right to counsel is knowingly and intelligently waived.
132. The salient difference between a summary contempt and a criminal trial is the summary
nature-there is literally no hearing in a summary contempt. Counsel thus could serve only a limited
purpose.
133. The competing interests are the historical and constitutional right to assistance of counsel,
on the one hand, and the need to control disruptive behavior and to compel witness cooperation and
the limited value counsel can serve, on the other hand. As the court noted, however, other jurisdictions
have split on the issue of which interest is primary. Saunders v. State, 319 So. 2d 118 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1975), specifically held thatArgersinger did not require counsel for direct contempt during
the course of the trial, while Commonwealth v. Crawford, 466 Pa. 269, 352 A. 2d 52 (1976), reached
a contrary result.
to counsel
134. The court recognized that if a jury trial is constitutionally required, then the right
would attach, presumably because an actual trial would be held. 100 N.M. at 178, 667 P.2d at 983.
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of allocution, the right to be heard, before sentence is imposed.' 35 The
court declined to recognize a right to present defenses. Case argued on
appeal that he should have been allowed to present evidence of duress
because he reasonably feared retaliation if he testified. Quoting from
Piemonte v. United States, 136 the court stated that no person has a right
to refuse to testify because of fear of reprisal. 37
' The action was remanded
for the state to elect whether to accept a maximum six-month sentence
or to choose a jury trial, in which event the sentence could exceed six
months. 131
City of Bernalillo v. Aragon139 involved an appeal from district court
following that court's review, on appeal, of a summary contempt adjudication by a municipal court. " The first issue was whether the contemnor
had a right to trial de novo on appeal to district court. As a general rule,
a defendant has a right to a trial de novo on appeal from municipal court
to district court. "' The court of appeals held that a trial de novo was not
required. The court's conclusion was premised in part upon the determination that no trial need be held for a summary contempt; therefore,
allowing a trial on appeal would be senseless.
In addressing the merits, the court determined that the defendant's
conduct warranted summary contempt. The defendant had argued that
his conduct did not justify conviction as a matter of law. The affidavits
of witnesses to the contemptuous conduct, which were part of the record,
reflected that the defendant had uttered expletives and had otherwise
engaged in inappropriate behavior. The court disposed of the argument
in short order, holding that summary contempt was entirely proper to
preserve order and decorum. The judgment was affirmed.
IX. GRAND JURY AND TRIAL PROCEDURE
A. Grand Jury
In State v. Cruz,'42 the defendant was served with notice of his status
as a target of a grand jury investigation. " The defendant appeared at the
135. Id. See Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488 (1974). See generally Sullivan, The Capital Defendant's Right to Make a Personal Plea for Mercy: Common Law Allocution and Constitutional
Mitigation, 15 N.M.L. Rev. 41, 56-60 (1985) (discussing the right of allocution in New Mexico).
136. 367 U.S. 556 (1961).
137. 100 N.M. at 177, 667 P.2d at 982. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948), goes so far as to
hold that there is no defense to summary contempt. A witness clearly has a right not to answer,
however, when he retains a fifth amendment right against self-incrimination.
138. If a contemnor is allowed a trial by jury, it is unclear what maximum sentence may be
imposed.
139. 100 N.M. 547, 673 P.2d 831 (Ct. App. 1983).
140. Municipal courts have authority to summarily punish contempts. N.M. R.P. Mun. Ct. 33(b).
141. N.M. R.P. Mun. Ct. 39.
142. 99 N.M. 690, 662 P.2d 1357 (1983).
143. The right to notice of status as a target of a grand jury investigation, and the accompanying
right to testify, are both statutory. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-6-11(B) (Repl. Pamp. 1984).
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courthouse on the day the grand jury was convened, unaccompanied by
an attorney. The prosecutor presenting the case asked the defendant whether
he wished to testify. The defendant equivocated and then indicated he
wanted to testify after another witness. The prosecutor informed the
defendant that the defendant could testify immediately or not at all.
Finally, the prosecutor told the defendant he had ten seconds to decide
and proceeded to count down, but the defendant still failed to decide.
Some time later, the defendant informed the prosecutor he wanted to
testify, but was told he could not. He was indicted, duly tried, and
convicted; he appealed, urging error in the failure to allow him to testify.
The court of appeals reversed his conviction, but on certiorari the supreme
court affirmed the trial court.
The issues on appeal were the sufficiency of notice to the defendant
and whether the prosecutor's conduct obstructed the defendant's right to
testify.' Based upon prior decisions of the court of appeals, the supreme
' On the obstruction issue,
court held that four days notice was sufficient. 45
the supreme court noted that a prosecutor has a duty "to protect both the
public's interest and the rights of the accused."'" Absent a finding that
the prosecutor's conduct reflected an impermissible motive, the court
declined to find error.
The most interesting aspect of the decision is Justice Riordan's concurring opinion. Recognizing that the right to testify is statutory and not
constitutional, 47 Justice Riordan characterized the right as one which is
not "substantial" within the meaning of Criminal Procedure Rule 7V48
Therefore, any error is not subject to review. In so doing, the concurrence
promotes the adoption of a rule that, absent some sort of extraordinary
need for relief, an indictment is not open to question once a defendant
has been convicted.' 49 It is likely this argument will be raised in the
future.
Ann. § 31to testify
are statutory. See N.M. Stat.
144. The defendant's right to notice and right
6-11(B) (Repl. Pamp. 1984).
145. 99 N.M. at 692, 662 P.2d at 1359. In Rogers v. State, 94 N.M. 218, 608 P.2d 530 (Ct.
App. 1980), it was determined that 36 hours notice to a target was sufficient.
146. 99 N.M. at 692, 662 P.2d at 1357.
147. 99 N.M. at 692-93, 662 P.2d at 1359-60 (Riordan, J., concurring); see supra note 143.
148. N.M. R. Crim. P. 7 provides, in relevant part, that "[an] indictment ... shall not be deemed
invalid, nor shall the trial, judgment or other proceedings thereon be . . .in any manner affected,
because of any defect, error . . .or repugnancy therein which does not prejudice the substantial
rights of the defendant upon the merits." In other words, indictments are invalid only if the substantial
rights of the defendant are prejudiced upon the merits. The right to testify before the grand jury is
not a substantial right. An indictment, therefore, is not to be deemed invalid where the right to
testify before the grand jury is denied.
149. This rationale was enunciated by Justice Jackson in his dissent in Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S.
282, 298 (1950). See also State v. Guse, 237 Or. 479, 392 P.2d 257 (1964); State v. Gortmaker,
60 Or. App. 723, 655 P.2d 575 (1982), affid on other grounds, 295 Or. 505, 668 P.2d 354 (1983).
The position is bottomed on the premise that guilt having been unanimously established beyond a
reasonable doubt by virtue of the conviction, any error in establishing probable cause is harmless
beyond peradventure. Other than the obvious limitations it places on review and supervision of grand
jury proceedings, the argument is compelling.
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In a case on a related issue, State v. Penner,'5 0 the court of appeals
held that a defendant must show "actual and substantial prejudice," beyond a mere showing that he wanted to testify, if he fails to receive
adequate notice. The statute requires that "actual and substantial prejudice" be shown before the burden of proving diligence in notifying the
target of his right to testify shifts to the prosecutor. 5' In this case, the
defendant argued that the prejudice existed because he had not been able
to testify due to lack of opportunity. The court of appeals held that the
defendant's burden is to "establish that his missing testimony would have
changed the vote of the grand jury on the issue of probable cause." '52
The defendant having failed to do so, there was no error.
B. Trial Procedure
1. Severance
In State v. Foye,'5 3 the defendant was charged with one count of attempted criminal sexual penetration and one count of criminal sexual
penetration. There were different victims for the two offenses. The defendant argued that the counts should be severed because he wanted to
testify on one count but not on the other. In affirming the trial court's
denial of the severance motion, the court of appeals made clear two
pertinent points.
First, the court specifically declined to follow the opinion in Cross v.
5 4 a case cited in the committee commentary to the sevUnited States,"
55
erance rule.' The court noted that Cross held that prejudice exists where
an accused desires to testify on one of two joined offenses that are "clearly
distinct in time, place and evidence." 5' 6 Recognizing, however, that Cross
has been limited,' 5 7 the court of appeals determined that, because evidence
of one offense might be admissible in the trial of the other, severance
would not serve the purposes advanced by the Cross rule.' 58
150. io0 N.M. 377, 671 P.2d 38 (Ct. App. 1983).
151. N.M. Stat. Ann. §31-6-11(B) (Repl. Pamp. 1984).
152. 100 N.M. at 379, 671 P.2d at 40. Buzbee v. Donnelly, 96 N.M. 692, 634 P.2d 1244 (1981),
is cited for the proposition. It is not clear that Buzbee addressed the issue of burden of proof. There
being no case in which a defendant was held to have produced sufficient evidence to meet the burden,
it is unclear what type and quantity of evidence is sufficient to show that the probable cause
determination would have been changed. An argument can be made that, given Buzbee and its
progeny (such as this case), New Mexico appellate courts have de facto adopted a rule under which
grand jury indictments are virtually unassailable, particularly after conviction. See supra notes 14749 and accompanying text.
153. 100 N.M. 385, 671 P.2d 46 (Ct. App. 1983).
154. 335 F.2d 987 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
155. N.M. R. Crim. P. 34.
156. 100 N.M. at 387, 671 P.2d at 48.
157. Id. at 388, 671 P.2d at 49; see, e.g., Baker v. United States, 401 F.2d 958 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
158. 100 N.M. at 388, 671 P.2d at 49; see, e.g., N.M. R. Evid. 404(b) (providing that evidence
of other crimes or wrongs may be admissible to show intent, plan, identity, or absence of mistake
or accident).
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Second, in discussing the cases following Cross, the court strongly
intimated that failure to sever will not be held to be an error unless the
defendant makes an actual showing of the nature of his testimony and
reasons for not wishing to testify on some offenses. The objective is to
allow the trial court to be satisfied that the claim of prejudice is genuine
and to allow the trial court to weigh the competing interests of judicial
economy against the defendant's interest in testifying. 59
' Thus, in order
to attempt severance, a defendant must reveal a substantial part of his
trial strategy.
2. Prosecutorial Misconduct
The defendant in State v. Diaz"° was charged with commercial burglary
and larceny. His defense was based on lack of intent due to intoxication.
During closing argument, primarily rebuttal, the prosecutor made numerous comments forming the basis of the appeal. First, the court of
appeals specifically condemned the trial court's procedure in waiting to
hear objections to closing argument until after the jury had retired to
deliberate. By that time the court could not correct the error through
issuance of a remedial instruction to the jury. Next, the court considered
the basic faults of the prosecutor's argument, which fell into three broad
categories: improper reference to the authority of the prosecutor; improper
characterization of the defendant; and derogation of an appropriate defense.
Improper reference to the prosecutor's authority concerned the prosecutor's extensive remarks referring to his role as protector of the rights
of the jury and other citizens. The court found these remarks to verge on
the expression of a personal opinion on the part of the prosecutor as to
the guilt of the defendant.'' As to the prosecutor's improper characterization of the defendant, the error was palpable. The prosecutor had
referred to the defendant as being a "yo-yo," "stupid," a "thief," and a
"crook." On the issue of derogation of a proper defense, the prosecutor
engaged in what amounted to a jury nullification argument. 62
' The pros159. The test was developed in Baker v. United States, 401 F.2d 958 (D.C. Cir. 1968). It has
been followed in United States v. Outler, 659 F.2d 1306 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S.
950 (1982); United States v. Reicherter, 647 F.2d 397 (3rd Ci. 1981); and State v. Roberts, 62
Ohio St. 2d 170, 405 N.E.2d 247, cert. denied 449 U.S. 879 (1980).
160. 100 N.M. 210, 668 P.2d 326 (Ct. App. 1983).
161. The argument is that such comments, presumably because of reference to the role of the
prosecutor as protector of truth and right, lead to the inference that the prosecutor would not be
there unless the prosecutor believed the defendant to be guilty. Under N.M. Code of Professional
Responsibility DR 7-106(C)(4), a lawyer cannot express a personal opinion as to the justness of a
cause, though under DR 7-103(A) a prosecutor has an obligation not to prosecute unless personally
satisfied of probable cause.
162. Jury nullification, a concept which has engendered not inconsiderable comment, is the notion
that a jury may, in effect, nullify the instructions given by the court by applying a "higher" standardmoral, humanitarian, political, or religious. It is most often utilized in political trials. See, e.g.,
Simson, Jury Nullification in the American System: A Skeptical View, 54 Tex. L. Rev. 488 (1976).
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ecutor argued that even if the jury believed the defendant could not form
the requisite intent, acquittal of the defendant would "send a message to
the community that would encourage similar crimes."' 63 The court of
appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the prosecutor's conduct
amounted to cumulative error.

X. EXTRADITION
In two opinions rising out of the same extradition, several points of
New Mexico law were clarified. In the first opinion, State ex rel. Schiff
v. Brennan,"6 the New Mexico Supreme Court followed the majority rule
holding that there is no right to bail after an arrest on a governor's
extradition warrant. Once the governor has issued a warrant, the fugitive
may contest it by a writ of habeas corpus, but he still must be remanded
to custody even though the warrant will be contested.
In Hopper v. State ex rel. Schiff,'65 the New Mexico Supreme Court
held that district courts cannot go behind charging documents to determine
whether actions of a fugitive amount to criminal behavior in the demanding state. In Hopper, after the governor's warrant had issued, the
fugitive sought a determination by writ of habeas corpus of whether the
acts he was alleged to have committed were crimes under the law of the
' the court
demanding state. "6Based largely upon Michigan v. Doran,67
can do
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request for extradition, and whether the petitioner is a fugitive. No other
inquiries may be made.
The court recognized that state law sets out a procedure for the governor
' In situations where
to follow in deciding whether to exercise discretion. 68
the governor may
only
however,
appropriate,
be
not
may
extradition
exercise discretion, not the courts.
163. 100 N.M. at214, 668 P.2d at330. If you accept the premise of the intoxication defense to
specific intent crimes, the argument is actually illogical. It is difficult to both be encouraged to do
an act and do the act without the intent to have done it.
164. 99 N.M. 641, 662 P.2d 642 (1983). This case was an extraordinary writ, filed in the supreme
court. The companion case proceeded by regular appeal.
165. 101 N.M.71, 678 P.2d 699 (1984).
166. The case apparently arose inthe context of a property dispute with a former spouse.
167. 439 U.S. 282 (1978).
168. 101 N.M. at 73, 678 P.2d at 701. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-4-4 (Repl. Pamp. 1984). The
case was decided primarily on the constitutional extradition provisions, U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2, cl.
2,and the federal implementing statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3182 (1982).
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XI. CONCLUSION

No single decision or area in criminal procedure this survey year significantly changed the law. In practical terms, the virtual elimination of
judicial disqualification will have the most impact. 169 Most other decisions
merely defined or clarified points of existing law.
The coming survey years should see how New Mexico applies recently
announced United States Supreme Court decisions interpreting the fourth
amendment. New Mexico courts still must decide whether they will hold
to the Aguilar-Spinelli standard for informant search warrants or whether
it will adopt "totality of the circumstances" as the appropriate test.17
The continued vitality of the exclusionary rule is also questionable. With
the virtual abandonment of the rule by the United States Supreme Court,
New Mexico is free to decide its own course. 7 ' Time, and the right cases,
will tell.

169. The longevity of State ex rel. Gesswein v. Galvan, 100 N.M. 769, 676 P.2d 1334, may be
limited. As this Article goes to press, the legislature has passed a bill granting each party to civil
or criminal action a single preemptory challenge to the presiding judge. The bill is awaiting action
by the governor. While the new statute would not answer the procedural/substantive right dichotomy,
it appears likely that the supreme court would reinstate disqualification if the new law is enacted.
See supra text accompanying notes 75-85.
170. See supra text accompanying notes 8-9.
171. See supra text accompanying notes 11-14.

